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Do clinically depressed individuals seek favorable or unfavorable information about the self? Self-
verification theory makes the counterintuitive prediction that depressed individuals solicit feedback
that confirms their negative self-views. To test this prediction, participants were classified on the basis
of a structured clinical interview and self-report measures into high self-esteem, low self-esteem, and
depressed groups. All participants were offered a choice between receiving favorable or unfavorable
feedback; 82% of the depressed participants chose the unfavorable feedback, compared to 64% of
the low self-esteem participants and 25% of the high self-esteem participants. Additional evidence
indicated that depressed individuals also failed to exploit fully an opportunity to acquire favorable
evaluations that were self-verifying. The authors discuss how seeking negative evaluations and failing
to seek favorable evaluations may help maintain depression.
A disturbing picture emerges from research addressing the
interpersonal aspects of depression: Depressed individuals seem
to create around themselves the very environments that sustain
their negative self-views. A wealth of empirical evidence has
demonstrated that the interpersonal style of depressed individ-
uals is characterized by a wide array of socially inappropriate
verbal and nonverbal behaviors, including but not limited to
excessive self-disclosure (Gibbons, 1987), hostile speech
content (Coyne, 1976a; Gotlib & Robinson, 1982), unfavor-
able self-evaluation (Hautzinger, Linden, & Hoffman, 1982),
lack of responsiveness (Bouhuys & van der Meulen, 1984), re-
duced eye contact (Dow & Craighead, 1987), negative facial
displays (G. E. Schwartz, Fair, Salt, Mandel & Klerman, 1976),
and slowed or monotonic speech (Teasdale, Fogarty, & Wil-
liams, 1980). Numerous studies have shown that enacting these
interpersonal behaviors elicits rejection and unfavorable evalu-
ations from interaction partners, and this holds whether the ac-
tor is actually depressed or merely a confederate role playing
the part (e.g., Coyne, 1976a; Gotlib & Beatty, 1985; Gurtman,
1987; Hokanson, Sacco, Blumberg, & Landrum, 1980; Joiner,
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Alfano, & Metalsky, 1992; Strack & Coyne, 1983; Swann,
Wenzlaff, Krull, & Pelham, 1992, Study 3). Rejection and hos-
tility from others, in turn, foster a depressogenic environment
that serves to confirm the unfavorable self-views of depressed
individuals, thereby maintaining or exacerbating a depressive
state (Andrews, 1989; Shustack & West, 1985; Swann, Wen-
zlaff, Krull, & Pelham, 1992). In effect, by engaging in a mal-
adaptive interpersonal style, depressed individuals become
caught up in a self-perpetuating cycle that sustains their
depression.
Why do depressed individuals behave in ways that contribute
to their own unhappiness? The most popular answer to this
question has been what we term the ironic perspective. This per-
spective suggests that, paradoxically, depressed individuals en-
act such behaviors out of a desire for positivity. In line with
this perspective, Coyne (1976b) has suggested that depressed
individuals are so motivated to seek favorable feedback in the
form of reassurance from others that their efforts often backfire.
By excessively and inappropriately demanding reassurance,
they tend to engender negative reactions in the very people from
whom they are seeking positive feedback (Joiner et al., 1992;
see also Gasparikova-Krasnec & Post, 1984). From this per-
spective, depressed persons strongly desire positive feedback but
use inappropriate strategies to elicit such reactions from others.
We propose an alternative to this approach, however. Over a
decade of research has established that individuals with nega-
tive self-views tend to solicit unfavorable information about the
self and gravitate toward others who provide such feedback (see
Swann, 1983,1990, in press). According to self-verification the-
ory, self-confirming evaluations are sought because they pro-
mote perceptions of prediction and control by fostering intra-
psychic and interpersonal coherence (Lecky, 1945; Secord &
Backman, 1965; Swann, 1990, in press). From an intrapsychic
perspective, confirming feedback serves to reassure people that
their self-views are veridical and reliable. Discrepant feedback,
on the other hand, threatens perceptions of prediction and con-
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trol as it suggests that the individual is misperceiving the most
basic aspect of existence, namely, one's self. By fostering a sense
of intrapsychic coherence and stability, evaluations that match
self-appraisals promote the perception that individuals are
correctly apprehending themselves and, by extension, their
surroundings.
Self-confirming evaluations also foster a sense of interper-
sonal coherence. When interacting with others, individuals are
more likely to attain social goals to the extent that their interac-
tion partners harbor realistic (i.e., neither excessively negative
nor excessively positive) expectations of them. Therefore, to
maximize the likelihood of predictable and manageable social
transactions, individuals gravitate toward and prefer to interact
with others who appraise them in a confirming manner.
In short, engaging in self-verification allows people to bolster
their sense of prediction and control by promoting intrapsychic
and interpersonal coherence (see Swann, Stein-Seroussi, &
Giesler, 1992). To attain self-verifying reactions, individuals
with high levels of self-esteem tend to solicit favorable feedback
from others because such feedback verifies their relatively posi-
tive self-views, whereas persons with low self-esteem tend to so-
licit unfavorable feedback because such evaluations confirm
their relatively negative self-views (e.g., Pelham, 1991; Swann,
Pelham, & Krull, 1989; Swann & Read, 1981a, 1981b; Swann,
Stein-Seroussi, & Giesler, 1992).
Self-Verification and Depression
Because most people possess predominantly positive self-
views, the desire for self-verification usually fosters a search for
favorable evaluations. Unfortunately, because depressed indi-
viduals possess relatively negative self-views (Beck, 1967; Gara
et al., 1993; Shustack & West, 1985), seeking confirming eval-
uations typically means seeking unfavorable feedback (e.g.,
Roth & Rehm, 1980; Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, & Pelham,
1992). Therefore, the feedback-seeking activities of depressed
individuals should mirror those of persons with low self-esteem.
Because both groups possess negative self-views, they should
both solicit unfavorable appraisals from others.
One possible difference between depressed individuals and
low self-esteem persons is that depressed individuals are more
likely to recover from their negative self-views. Although the
available research is somewhat equivocal, longitudinal studies
have demonstrated that following the remission of depression,
self-esteem returns to normal levels (e.g., Hamilton & Abram-
son, 1983; cf. Cofer & Wittenborn, 1980). Thus, the negative
self-views of depressed individuals may be more transient than
those of people with low self-esteem. Nevertheless, a tendency
for the negative self-views of depressed individuals to be unsta-
ble does not mean they are not held with great conviction. As
numerous researchers and clinicians have noted, depressed in-
dividuals often cling to their negative self-views with unex-
pected tenacity during depressive episodes (e.g., Beck, Rush,
Shaw, & Emery, 1979). This is important because from the per-
spective of self-verification theory, people attempt to confirm
those self-views that are held with certainty (Maracek &
Mettee, 1972; Swann & Ely, 1984; Swann, Pelham, & Chidester,
1988). Thus, the sometimes transient nature of the self-views
of depressed individuals should not alter the expression of self-
verification strivings during depressive episodes: Currently de-
pressed persons, like nondepressed persons, should seek evalua-
tions that confirm their firmly held self-views.
To investigate self-verification processes in depression,
Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, and Pelham (1992) and Swann, Wen-
zlaff, and Tafarodi (1992) directly assessed feedback seeking in
college students classified as depressed or dysphoric on the basis
of the short form of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck
& Beck, 1972). Swann and his colleagues found that when com-
pared to nondepressed participants, depressed participants pre-
ferred to be viewed in a relatively negative manner by their
friends and dating partners and exhibited a corresponding pref-
erence for interaction partners who had evaluated them unfa-
vorably in a laboratory setting. Swann, Wenzlaff, and Tafarodi
(1992, Study 1) showed that depressed participants preferred
to interact with an unfavorable evaluator even when they had
the option of engaging in an unrelated task. Moreover, in a fol-
lowing study, they offered support for the motivational charac-
ter of these feedback preferences in depression: Mildly de-
pressed persons were more likely to solicit information
about their weaknesses following exposure to positive (i.e.,
nonconfirming) as compared to negative (i.e., confirming)
feedback. Finally, in a prospective study, the desire of dysphoric
individuals for negative feedback from their roommate at mid-
semester was associated with rejection by their roommate at
semester's end (Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, & Pelham, 1992).
Taken together, these studies suggest that depressed or dys-
phoric individuals are motivated to seek unfavorable appraisals
and that their tendency to acquire such evaluations may result
in rejection and other adverse outcomes.
This is not to imply, however, that depressed people are sin-
gle-mindedly drawn to negative feedback. For example, Swann,
Wenzlaff, Krull, and Pelham (1992, Study 4) revealed a tension
between the desire for self-verification and the desire for positi-
vity among persons with negative self-views. Participants were
first provided with either negative or positive feedback, after
which their affective reactions were assessed. The investigators
found that participants with negative self-views were sad and
upset after initially receiving unfavorable feedback and happy
and pleased after initially receiving favorable feedback. When
presented with the opportunity to choose further feedback,
however, participants with negative self-views solicited unfavor-
able feedback, despite the fact that receiving such feedback dis-
tressed them. These findings suggest that people with negative
self-views in general and depressed individuals in particular
may be caught in a crossfire between their desire for positivity
and their desire for self-verification (Joiner, Alfano, & Metalsky,
1993; Shrauger, 1975; Swann, Griffin, Predmore, & Gaines,
1987).
Or are they? Critics of research by Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull,
and Pelham (1992) have suggested that the self-verification
strivings displayed by their participants are limited to people
who have mildly negative self-views. Specifically, Hooley and
Richters (1992) have suggested that persons classified solely on
the basis of the BDI may not necessarily meet clinical criteria
for depression and therefore may differ qualitatively from indi-
viduals who are "truly" depressed (e.g., Coyne, 1994; Tennen
& Affleck, 1993; cf. Vredenburg, Flett, & Krames, 1993). Be-
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pressed individuals is likely to be more aversive than that of per-
sons who do not necessarily meet criteria for the full disorder
(e.g., individuals identified by self-report inventories), truly de-
pressed individuals may be more motivated to solicit positive
feedback and less likely to indulge their desire for verifying feed-
back. Additionally, although diminished self-esteem is highly
associated with clinical depression, depressed individuals differ
from nondepressed persons with low self-esteem in a variety of
important ways (e.g., depressed individuals tend to experience
heightened self-focus, impairments in effortful processing, per-
sistent negative mood, somatic symptoms, etc.). Thus, the feed-
back-seeking behavior of clinically depressed individuals may
differ in important ways from that of individuals who possess
negative .self-views but are not clinically depressed.
The primary goal of the present investigation was to deter-
mine whether clinically depressed persons would solicit unfa-
vorable or favorable feedback. We also sought to determine the
lengths to which depressed people would go in their search for
unfavorable evaluations. As suggested by several recent investi-
gations, positivity strivings may remain at least partially active
during depression (e.g., Dunning & Story, 1991; Pelham, 1991)
and may therefore guide feedback preference and solicitation.
Moreover, past research has also shown that although people
with negative self-views choose unfavorable evaluations when
seeking information pertaining to their weaknesses, if they have
opportunity to seek information about their strengths, they do
so (Swann, Pelham, & Krull, 1989). Nevertheless, because past
research has focused on people (usually college students) clas-
sified on the basis of self-report inventories, it is possible that a
different picture would emerge if clinically depressed persons
were examined. Conceivably, the exceptionally negative self-
views of clinically depressed persons could cause them to pass
up the opportunity to receive evaluations about their strengths.
Although we were primarily interested in how depressed in-
dividuals compared to nondepressed persons with average levels
of self-esteem (i.e., high self-esteem individuals), we also
wished to discover whether the feedback-seeking activities of de-
pressed individuals would differ from those of persons with low
self-esteem. Because both groups possess negative self-views,
self-verification theory predicts that both depressed and low
self-esteem individuals should display a preference for unfavor-
able appraisals over favorable appraisals. For these two groups,
unfavorable feedback is particularly likely to be regarded as self-
confirming and thus is preferred over favorable feedback, which
tends to be regarded as less self-confirming and therefore less
desirable. As such, we recruited two groups of individuals pos-
sessing similar levels of negative self-views. The members of one
group were clinically depressed; the members of the other were
not. Any differences in feedback seeking between the two
groups could thus be attributed to the effects of depression or its
naturally occurring correlates, because both groups possessed
equally negative self-views.
To determine whether clinically depressed individuals desire
positive or negative information about themselves, the current
investigation classified depressed individuals on the basis of a
structured diagnostic interview using criteria of the third re-
vised Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM-HI-R; American Psychiatric Association, 1987). We
then exposed these participants to a standard self-verification
paradigm in which they were provided with the opportunity to
choose between receiving positive or negative feedback. In ad-
dition, to assess their preferences for information about
strengths and weaknesses, we asked participants to rank order a
series of relatively positive and negative attributes, indicating on
which attributes they most wanted to receive feedback.
Method
Overview
After having earlier completed a series of questionnaires, each partic-
ipant was led to believe that two advanced graduate students had each
begun to prepare a personality profile of the participant, based on the
participant's questionnaire responses. Ostensibly, time constraints al-
lowed the participant to examine only one of the profiles. Each partici-
pant was asked to choose which profile to examine on the basis of sum-
marized versions. One summary was negative; one was positive. A few
minutes later, participants rated how much they wished to examine
both in-depth profiles. Following these ratings, participants who ini-
tially qualified as depressed were interviewed to confirm their clinical
status.
Participants
Three different groups of participants were recruited. Participants
were either (a) clinically depressed, that is, they met DSM-III-R
(American Psychiatric Association, 1987) criteria for current major de-
pression; (b) nondepressed and possessing high self-esteem; or (c) non-
depressed and possessing low self-esteem. Classifications were made ini-
tially on the basis of personality inventory scores or screening in-
terviews, and depression was confirmed by means of the nonpatient
version of the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-HI-R (SCID;
Spitzer, Williams, Gibbon & First, 1990).
Participants were recruited from the University of Texas' Department
of Psychology research participant pool and through ads placed in local
newspapers. Potential participants from the psychology research pool,
identified through their scores on the short form of the BDI (Beck &
Beck, 1972) administered during a mass pretesting session, were se-
lected and contacted. Nonpool participants who responded to ads
placed in local newspapers were initially classified on the basis of a short
screening interview given over the phone. For all participants, final as-
signment into each of the three groups was performed according to their
scores on the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Inventory (Rosenberg, 1965) and
the long form of the BDI (Beck & Beamesderfer, 1974), which were
completed prior to the experimental session, and on the basis of the
SCID, which was conducted by an advanced graduate student pre-
viously trained in its administration.
1
1 Because the reliability of the SCID to diagnose major depression
has been repeatedly demonstrated and similar to past work (e.g., Hewitt
& Flett, 1993), SCID reliability was not re-assessed in this study. How-
ever, to provide further validation that the interviewer was able to diag-
nose current major depression reliably, we first identified a sample of 14
individuals who had either just completed or were beginning a
multiweek, therapeutic program for depression. The interviewer, who
was blind to the status of those he was interviewing, administered the
section of the SCID assessing current major depression to each individ-
ual. A clinical psychologist with extensive SCID experience attended
each interview and simultaneously completed a separate SCID. The in-
terviewer identified 5 of the 14 participants as experiencing current ma-
jor depression. The agreement rate between the interviewer and the cli-
nician was 100%, supporting our contention that the interviewer was
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Participants in the high and low self-esteem groups were required to
score 15 or less on the BDI and in the top or bottom 30th percentiles of
the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Inventory, respectively. Participants in the
depressed group were required to score 16 or more on the BDI and to
meet SCID criteria for current major depression. Participants recruited
from the participant pool received course credit for their participation;
nonpool participants were paid $ 10 for their time.
Nine participants originally recruited for the depressed group on the
basis of either the short screening interview or their BDI score did not
meet SCID criteria for current major depression and were excluded
from the analysis. Although the depressed group was composed of a
greater percentage of community members (46%) than the low (24%)
and high self-esteem groups (25%), pool and community participants
within the same status group did not differ reliably on any relevant vari-
ables (e.g., Rosenberg score, BDI score, feedback choice, desire to see
the positive and negative profiles, etc.). Gender distribution across the
three groups was approximately equal, with 60%, 70%, and 60% of the
members of the high self-esteem, low self-esteem, and depressed groups,
respectively, being female. Finally, several participants did not complete
fully either the preexperimental questionnaires or portions of the de-
pendent measures, resulting in sample sizes that differ across various
analyses.
Procedure
Prior to the experimental session, participants were sent a packet of
questionnaires to complete. The packet consisted of the following: the
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Inventory (Rosenberg, 1965); the Self-Attri-
butes Questionnaire (SAQ; Pelham & Swann, 1989), which measures
individuals' self-perceived standings on five specific traits (e.g., social
competence, intellectual ability, etc.); a question assessing how much
the participant desires feedback about himself or herself; the long form
of the BDI (Beck & Beamesderfer, 1974); and several other demograph-
ics and filler personality scales. The response key of the SAQ was altered
slightly to account for the fact that not all participants were students
(i.e., instead of rating themselves on each SAQ attribute relative to other
students, participants were asked to rate themselves relative to others in
general).
On arriving for the experimental session, each participant was told
that as part of a training exercise, two advanced graduate students in
the psychology department would be constructing a personality assess-
ment of the participant on the basis of his or her answers to the ques-
tionnaire packet. In the meantime, the experimenter would conduct a
standard clinical interview (the SCID) with the participant in order to
acquire additional information. Once participants agreed to partici-
pate, the experimenter indicated that if time allowed, the graduate stu-
dents would be able to give participants specific feedback on some of
their SAQ attributes. Participants were then asked to rank the five SAQ
attributes in the order of how much they wanted to receive feedback on
each one. This ancillary measure of feedback seeking allowed us to as-
sess whether participants preferred feedback pertaining to their
strengths or to their weaknesses.
After participants rank ordered the SAQ attributes, the experimenter
reported that each graduate student was in the process of compiling a
"personality summary" of the participant that the participant would be
able to examine. The summaries would supposedly reflect the longer,
more in-depth personality assessment participants would receive later
in the session. Before retrieving the summaries, the experimenter stated
that because of a scheduling error, time constraints prohibited the par-
ticipant from reading through both in-depth assessments and that the
participant would need to choose which assessment to examine on the
basis of the summaries. In actuality, all participants received the same
two summaries. One summary was positive (e.g., this person seems well
adjusted, self-confident, happy, etc.); one was negative (e.g., this person
Table 1
Rosenberg and BDI Scores Across the Three Groups
Rosenberg score BDI score
Group M SD M SD
High self-esteem
Low self-esteem
Depressed
20
25
28
38.15
20.40
18.78
1.50
3.46
7.36
3.85
7.84
26.46
4.87
4.16
6.75
Note. Rosenberg scores can range from 0 to 40, with higher numbers
denoting greater self-esteem. Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) scores
can range from 0 to 63, with higher numbers denoting greater depres-
seems unhappy, unconfident, uncomfortable around others, etc.). Par-
ticipants' choice of assessment comprised one of the primary dependent
variables.
Before exiting to retrieve the summaries, the experimenter explained
that participants were required to perform a brief exercise to insure that
all participants began the interview from the same mental state.
2 The
experimenter then exited and returned a few minutes later with a folder
containing the two summaries. Participants were given as much time as
they desired to read the summaries, after which they were asked to in-
dicate verbally their assessment choice. The experimenter then asked
participants to rate how much they desired to read each assessment
on 11-point scales ranging from not at all to very much. Afterwards,
participants rated the accuracy and favorability of each graduate stu-
dent's summary on four 11-point scales. The former ratings allowed us
to assess feedback preferences on a continuous scale; the latter deter-
mined whether participants could discriminate between the positive
and negative summaries and allowed us to determine how self-confirm-
ing (i.e., subjectively accurate) the summaries were perceived to be.
After completing the ratings, those participants originally assigned to
the depression group were administered the SCID in order to confirm
their clinical status. All participants were then debriefed and either as-
signed course credit or paid $ 10, as appropriate. Special care was taken
to ensure that participants in the depression group did not become up-
set or distressed over the procedure. Additionally, information pertain-
ing to community counseling services was made available to all who
participated.
Results
Classification Status
To confirm classification status, participants' scores on the
BDI and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Inventory were each sub-
mitted to a one-way (status: high self-esteem, low self-esteem,
or depressed) analysis of variance (ANOVA). As depicted in
Table 1, the analysis confirmed that participants classified as
high in self-esteem, low in self-esteem, and depressed exhibited
corresponding scores on the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Inventory,
F(2, 70) = 98.86, p < .0001, and on the BDI, F(2, 70) =
2 Exercise type (control or letter shadowing task) originally consti-
tuted an additional two-level independent variable but did not produce
any main or interactive effects on any of the major dependent measures.
To ensure collapsing across exercise type was appropriate, we carried
out the same set of analyses reported in the Results section solely on the
participants in the control condition. The patterns of findings closely
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Table 2
Perceived Accuracy and Favorability Ratings
of the Positive and Negative Summaries
Perceived accuracy
of summary
Perceived favorability
of summary
Group Positive Negative Positive Negative
High self-esteem
M
SD
Low self-esteem
M
SD
Depressed
M
SD
9.70
1.08
6.60
2.10
5.67
2.67
2.45
1.82
6.48
2.10
7.89
2.15
9.70
1.38
9.04
1.43
8.48
2.68
2.95
2.42
4.52
2.08
6.41
2.90
Note. Higher numbers denote greater perceived accuracy or favorabil-
ity. Scores can range from 1 to 11.
122.94, p < .0001. T tests revealed that all groups' Rosenberg
and BDI scores differed significantly from one another (all ps <
.005) except for the Rosenberg scores of depressed and low self-
esteem participants, t( 51) = 1.00, p < .32.
One-way ANOVAs conducted on demographics data revealed
no differences between groups on gender, race, or educational
achievement Variables, Fs < 1. However, the depressed group
was older on average (M = 24.64, SD = 7.09) than the low self-
esteem group (M = 18.88,51)= 1.56) and the high self-esteem
group (M= 18.60, SD = 1.31), F(2, 70) = 15.47, p< .0001.
Past investigations using participants ranging in age from 17 to
78 have indicated that age generally does not affect self-verifi-
cation strivings (e.g., Swann, Hixon, & De La Ronde, 1992),
and using age as a covariate in the analyses reported in the cur-
rent investigation did not significantly change participants'
choice of or desire for positive and negative feedback. Thus, age
was not included in any of the analyses reported below.
Manipulation Checks
Because the perceived match between feedback and self-
views plays a critical role from the perspective of self-verifica-
tion theory, we first examined participants' ratings of how self-
confirming (i.e., accurate) they found the summaries to be us-
ing a 3 (group: high self-esteem, low self-esteem, or depressed)
X 2 (summary type: positive or negative) ANOVA. As indicated
by the significant interaction term, F( 2,69) = 41.62, p < .0001,
and as depicted by the means in Table 2, high self-esteem people
perceived the positive summary to be more self-confirming than
the negative summary, F( 1, 19) = 158.84, p < .0001, and de-
pressed participants rated the negative summary as more self-
confirming than the positive summary, F(l, 26) = 7.73, p <
.01. Note, however, that low self-esteem participants perceived
the two summaries to be equally self-confirming, F < 1. These
findings are particularly important. From the perspective of
self-verification theory, how self-confirming feedback is per-
ceived to be determines the desirability of feedback. We would
thus expect that the low self-esteem persons in our study would
tend not to show a significant preference for one summary over
the other, whereas high self-esteem participants should prefer
the favorable summary and depressed participants should pre-
fer the negative summary.
We also examined ratings of the perceived favorability of the
two summaries using the same 3 (group: high self-esteem, low
self-esteem, or depressed) X 2 (summary type: positive or
negative) ANOVA. As expected, a main effect was attained for
summary type, F(1,69) = 113.54, p< .0001, with the positive
summary being viewed as more favorable than the negative
summary across groups. However, the interaction term was also
significant, F(2, 69) = 10.31, p < .0001. As depicted by the
means in Table 2, the three groups did not differ in their per-
ceptions of the favorability of the positive summary, F( 2,69) =
2.17, p > .12, but we were somewhat concerned that they
differed in their perceptions of the favorability of the negative
summary, F( 2,69) = 11.15, p < .0001, with depressed partici-
pants viewing the negative summary in the most favorable light.
However, depressed participants still clearly perceived the sum-
maries as dissimilar: The negative summary was rated as sig-
nificantly more unfavorable than the positive summary by de-
pressed participants, F( 1,26) = 5.95, p < .02, and this also held
true for the high self-esteem participants, F( 1, 19) = 87.55, p
< .0001, as well as the low self-esteem participants, F( 1,24) =
83.82, p < .0001. This issue is discussed further in the section
Clarifying the Role of Perceived Accuracy in the Desire for Neg-
ative Evaluation.
Evaluation Choice
Evaluation choice (i.e., summary choice) comprised one of
the primary dependent variables of interest. A chi-square pro-
cedure was used to examine the percentage of individuals in
each group who chose the positive and negative summaries. As
predicted by self-verification theory, the analysis indicated that
group membership determined feedback choice, x
2(2, N = 73)
= 16.13, p < .0001, with 82% of the depressed participants, 64%
of the low self-esteem participants, and only 25% of the high
self-esteem participants choosing the negative evaluation.
Recall that high self-esteem participants rated the positive
summary more self-confirming than the negative, low self-
esteem participants rated the summaries as equally self-con-
firming, and depressed participants rated the negative sum-
mary more self-confirming than the positive. On the basis of
these ratings, we expected that a smaller proportion of high self-
esteem participants would choose the negative summary com-
pared to the low self-esteem participants, z = 2.6, p < .005, one-
tailed, and that a smaller proportion of low self-esteem par-
ticipants would choose the negative summary compared to
depressed participants, z = 1.5, p < .07, one-tailed. Although
all effects were in the predicted direction, the difference between
depressed and low self-esteem persons did not quite attain con-
ventional levels of significance. As we predicted, depressed par-
ticipants exhibited a clear preference for negative feedback (i.e.,
82% chose the unfavorable evaluation). However, low self-
esteem participants also exhibited the same preference, al-
though in weaker form (i.e., 64% chose the unfavorable
evaluation).
This finding prompted us to examine further the evaluation
choices of the low self-esteem participants, specifically those ofSELF-VERIFICATION AND DEPRESSION 363
Table 3
Preference Ratings for Positive and Negative Feedback
Summary
Group
High self-esteem
M
SD
Low self-esteem
M
SD
Depressed
M
SD
Positive
9.40
2.14
8.24
2.65
7.93
3.16
Negative
8.40
2.44
8.64
2.33
9.86
2.03
Difference
score
1.00
2.22
-0.40
3.16
-1.93
3.48
Note. Preference ratings can range from 1 to 11, with greater numbers
denoting greater preference.
the 22 low self-esteem participants who perceived one summary
to be more self-confirming than the other. For those who felt
that the negative summary was more self-confirming than the
positive, 11 of 11 chose the negative summary. Of the 11 who
perceived the positive summary to be more self-confirming than
the negative, 8 chose the positive summary, x
2( 1, N = 22) =
12.57, p < .0001. Thus, even though only a marginally signifi-
cant difference existed between low self-esteem participants'
and depressed participants' average feedback choices, on an id-
iographic level, the feedback preferences of low self-esteem par-
ticipants were still highly associated with how self-confirming
they perceived the two summaries to be.
3
Evaluation Preferences
We also examined participants' continuous ratings of how
much they desired to view the positive and negative summaries
using a 3 (group: high self-esteem, low self-esteem, or
depressed) X 2 (summary type: positive or negative) ANOVA.
As indicated by the significant interaction term, F(2, 70) =
5.25, p < .008, and depicted by the difference scores in Table 3,
high self-esteem participants reported a marginally significant
preference for the favorable summary, F( 1, 19) = 4.04, p < .06,
low self-esteem participants displayed no preference, F<\, and
depressed participants preferred the unfavorable summary to
the favorable summary, F( 1, 28) = 8.29, p < .007. Consistent
with self-verification theory, participants tended to prefer the
summary they perceived as most self-confirming.
Clarifying the Role of Perceived Accuracy in the Desire
for Negative Evaluation
Although depressed and low self-esteem participants pos-
sessed equivalent levels of self-esteem, depressed participants
preferred the negative summary to the positive summary,
whereas low self-esteem participants did not exhibit a prefer-
ence. This finding indicates that the presence-absence of de-
pression or its naturally occurring correlates contributed to
participants' desire for negative feedback over and above any
contributions made by self-esteem. As suggested by the pattern
of accuracy ratings in Table 2, depression exerted its effects by
influencing perceptions of accuracy, causing the depressed par-
ticipants to view the negative summary as more accurate (i.e.,
self-confirming) than the favorable summary, thus increasing
the negative summary's desirability.
To verify that differences between each group's desire for the
negative summary could be attributed to differences in how the
negative summary was perceived, we performed the following
regression analyses on our entire sample. Using the desire for
the negative summary as the dependent variable and group
membership as an explanatory variable, we first established that
group membership was indeed related to the desire to receive
negative feedback, F(2, 70) = 3.05, p < .054, R
2 = .08. We
next added participants' perceptions of the accuracy and the
favorability of the negative evaluation to the model. The result-
ing analysis, F( 4,67)= 3.95,p<.006,/?
2 = .19, confirmed our
expectations: Perceived accuracy attained significance, F(l,
67) = 3.87, p < .053, whereas group membership and perceived
favorability did not, F(2, 67) = 1.04, p < .36, and F( 1, 67)
= 1.95, p < .17, respectively. These results suggest that group
membership per se and perceived favorability had no indepen-
dent effect on feedback preference (i.e., group membership and
perceived favorability could only have influenced participants'
preferences by affecting perceived accuracy).
In line with self-verification theory, differences between the
three groups' desire for negative evaluation seem to be directly
related to their perceptions of how self-confirming they found
the negative summary to be. Furthermore, these differences do
not seem to be related to the perceived favorability of the sum-
mary. Note that this finding demonstrates that depressed par-
ticipants were not "encouraged" to prefer the negative sum-
mary because it appeared more favorable to them than to high
and low self-esteem participants. As indicated by the regression
analyses, only perceived accuracy influenced participants' pref-
erences for the negative evaluation.
Additionally, we also applied the same regression model using
participants' desire to view the positive evaluation as the depen-
dent variable and group membership, perceived accuracy of the
positive summary, and perceived favorability of the positive
summary as the three explanatory variables, F(4, 67) = 14.64,
p < .0001, R
2 = .47. Once again, perceived accuracy attained
significance, F(1, 67) = 48.65, p < .0001, whereas perceived
favorability did not, F( 1, 67) = 1.61, p < .21. Unlike the previ-
ous analysis, which used desire to view the negative evaluation
as the dependent variable, in the current analysis group mem-
bership retained significance, F(2, 67) = 3.50, p < .04, and the
3 Before concluding this section, we wished to determine whether we
could replicate the results of past studies addressing feedback choice in
depression that relied solely on BDI scores to classify depressed partici-
pants. Using the traditional cut-off of >9 on the BDI (Coyne, 1994), we
divided our total sample into a nondepressed group (mean BDI score =
3.50, SD = 2.98, N = 32) and a depressed group (mean BDI score =
22.00, SD = 8.70, N = 41). In line with prior research, a chi-square
analysis revealed that 78% of the depressed group chose the negative
summary, whereas only 38% of the nondepressed group chose the nega-
tive summary, x
2(l, N = 13) = 12.34, p < .0001. These results are
consistent with past research suggesting that individuals possessing ele-
vated BDI scores prefer unfavorable feedback over favorable feedback
(e.g., Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, & Pelham, 1992).364 GIESLER, JOSEPHS, AND SWANN
resulting R
2 was considerably higher. Because of these differ-
ences, a conclusive interpretation of this analysis is not possible.
Nevertheless, the analysis does provide further support for the
self-verification perspective: The more self-confirming the pos-
itive summary was perceived to be, the more the positive evalu-
ation was desired.
Ranking of Feedback Preferences for Strengths and
Weaknesses
The previous findings indicate that when presented with the
opportunity to solicit either confirming, unfavorable feedback
or nonconfirming, favorable feedback, depressed participants
chose the unfavorable feedback. This does not mean, however,
that they had no positivity strivings whatsoever, as they may
have chosen favorable feedback that was also confirming if given
the opportunity. To investigate this possibility, all participants
were asked to rank the five SAQ attributes in order of feedback
preference. Positivity strivings should cause participants to so-
licit feedback on those attributes they felt were their best. Thus,
if positivity strivings were present, the attribute participants
ranked first should generally be their best (highest rated) attri-
bute, the attribute they ranked second, should be their second
best attribute, and so forth.
As depicted in Table 4, linear trend analysis conducted on
each group's pattern of self-ratings indicated that those attri-
butes that participants most desired feedback about tended to
be the ones they had previously endorsed as their best; those
attributes participants least desired feedback about tended to
be the ones they had previously indicated were their worst, F( 1,
21) = 11.51, p < .003, for depressed participants, F(l, 24) =
42.09, p < .0001, for low self-esteem participants, and F(1,17)
= 27.30, p < .0001, for high self-esteem participants.
However, the means in Table 4 suggest that depressed partic-
ipants may have been less likely to rank their better attributes
first compared to high and low self-esteem participants (e.g.,
depressed participants' third-ranked attribute is slightly greater
than their first-ranked attribute). To examine this issue more
closely, we focused on the attribute participants rated as their
best. Specifically, we looked at the number of individuals in each
group who ranked their best attribute first, second, third,
fourth, and fifth (e.g., someone who ranked their best attribute
first would most desire feedback about their highest rated attri-
bute; someone who ranked their best attribute fifth would least
Table 4
Self-Ratings on SAQ Attributes Ranked in Order
of Feedback Preference
Attribute ranked
Group 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
High self-esteem
Low self-esteem
Depressed
8.11
6.16
6.23
8.17
6.44
6.41
7.56
5.80
6.41
7.00
5.28
5.82
5.06
3.64
4.36
Note. Self-Attributes Questionnaire (SAQ) ratings can range from 1
to 10, with higher numbers denoting greater self-perceived standing on
that attribute.
Table 5
Preference Rankings of Best Attribute
Best attribute ranked
Group 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
High self-esteem
Low self-esteem
Depressed
.58
.48
.36
.26
.40
.18
.05
.12
.23
.05
.00
.14
.05
.00
.09
Note. Numbers indicate the percentage of participants in each group
who ranked their best attribute 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, or 5th. Rounding
prevents some percentages from summing to 1.00.
desire feedback about their highest rated attribute). Positivity
strivings, if functioning, should lead individuals to rank their
best attribute first.
As depicted in Table 5 and confirmed by a Mantel-Haenszel
test for linearity, x
2( 1, N = 73) = 3.90, p < .05, group mem-
bership was significantly related to the best attribute's rank.
High self-esteem participants were most likely to list their best
attribute first: 58% of them did so while most of the remaining
42% listed their best attribute second. Only 48% of low self-
esteem participants ranked their best attribute first; the major-
ity of the remaining 52% listed their best attribute second. Most
strikingly, only 36% of the depressed participants ranked their
best attribute first, with the remaining 64% spread out mostly
among the second, third, and fourth ranks.
The pattern that emerges from the foregoing analyses suggests
that whereas depressed persons retain some positivity strivings,
such strivings are attenuated. Apparently, even when positive
evaluations can be obtained without violating concerns for self-
verification, depressed persons appear unable to take full ad-
vantage of the situation.
Interest in Receiving Feedback
One question unanswered by previous investigations con-
cerns the extent to which depressed individuals desire feedback
about themselves. It is possible that the apathy and inactivity
that characterizes depression would tend to negate their desire
for feedback, even when such information could be gained rel-
atively effortlessly. To investigate this possibility, participants'
estimates of how much they desired feedback, self-reported on
9-point Likert-type scales, were submitted to a one-way AN-
OVA (group: high self-esteem, low self-esteem, depressed). The
analysis revealed an effect for group, F( 1, 64) = 3.15, p < .05,
such that high self-esteem participants most desired feedback,
followed closely by depressed participants, followed by low self-
esteem participants (Ms = 7.05, 6.85, and 5.75, and SDs =
1.39, 1.85, and 2.15, respectively). rtests revealed that high
self-esteem and depressed participants desired feedback
equally, t < 1, and that both groups indicated a reliably or mar-
ginally reliably greater interest in receiving such information
than did low self-esteem participants, t( 39) = 2.20, p < .03, and
f(48) = 1.94,p < .06, respectively.
Discussion
What types of information about the self do clinically de-
pressed individuals seek? As predicted, when given a choice be-SELF-VERIFICATION AND DEPRESSION 365
tween receiving relatively favorable or unfavorable feedback,
depressed participants preferred unfavorable feedback. In con-
trast, high self-esteem participants preferred favorable feed-
back, and low self-esteem participants preferred favorable and
unfavorable feedback equally. In line with self-verification the-
ory, participants' feedback choice appeared driven by how self-
confirming they perceived the feedback to be, regardless of
group membership.
Despite the foregoing results, additional analyses indicated
that depressed participants did retain positivity strivings. When
asked to rank the SAQ attributes in order of feedback prefer-
ence, depressed and nondepressed participants tended to list
their best attributes before their worst attributes. On the other
hand, when we focused on how much participants desired feed-
back about their best trait, we found a linear relationship across
the three groups such that high self-esteem participants most
wanted feedback about their best attribute, followed by low self-
esteem participants, followed by depressed participants. Hence,
although depressed participants clearly possess positivity striv-
ings, these strivings are attenuated.
Taken together, these data indicate that the feedback-seeking
activities of depressed individuals may be problematic for two
reasons. First, when forced to choose between favorable but
nonverifying and unfavorable but verifying evaluations, de-
pressed individuals choose the unfavorable evaluations. Sec-
ond, when presented with the opportunity to seek favorable
evaluations that are also verifying, they fail to exploit the situa-
tion fully. That is, not only do depressed individuals avoid eval-
uations that they perceive as overly favorable, but they also fail
to pursue favorable evaluations that they believe they deserve.
Apparently, they feel uncomfortable with the general tenor of
favorable but verifying evaluations. Consistent with this suppo-
sition, Swann, Wenzlaff, and Tafarodi (1992, Study 1) found
that dysphoric individuals chose being in a different experiment
over interacting with a favorable evaluator. Furthermore, in a
follow-up study, Swann et al. discovered that when dysphoric
individuals received favorable evaluations, they intensified their
search for unfavorable information about themselves.
In the current investigation and similar to past studies (e.g.,
Swann, Wenzlaff, & Tafarodi, 1992), the perceived match be-
tween self-views and feedback appeared to drive feedback pref-
erences. These findings suggest that in general, individuals with
low self-esteem seek negative feedback because such feedback
is verifying, whereas the opposite is true for high self-esteem
persons. However, it should be emphasized that from the per-
spective of self-verification theory, feedback preference depends
chiefly on how self-confirming feedback is perceived to be. As
evidenced in the current investigation, such perceptions are
driven not only by one's level of self-esteem but also by other
factors, such as the presence of depression. Although depressed
and low self-esteem participants in the current study possessed
equivalent levels of general self-views, they differed in their rel-
ative preferences for the favorable and unfavorable evaluations.
Apparently, depression or its naturally occurring correlates
made the unfavorable evaluation appear more self-descriptive
than the favorable evaluation to depressed participants.
Consistent with this idea, past research has demonstrated
that depressed compared to nondepressed persons are espe-
cially likely to endorse negative items as self-descriptive (e.g.,
Bargh & Tola, 1988; Gara et al., 1993; Pyszczynski, Holt, &
Greenberg, 1987), and, in fact, Beck and his colleagues (Beck,
Rush. Shaw, & Emery, 1979) have argued that one of the pri-
mary features that distinguishes depressed from nondepressed
persons is that the former are especially likely to interpret events
in ways that confirm their negative self-views. Although consis-
tent with past research, the results of the current investigation
do not permit definitive conclusions to be drawn regarding why
depressed and low self-esteem persons differed in how self-
confirming they perceived the summaries to be. Several factors
were probably responsible. For example, because the negative
summary contained descriptors that could be abstracted from
both the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Inventory (e.g., unconfident)
and the SCID (e.g., unhappy), it could well be the case that the
negative summary was perceived as being more self-confirming
than the positive summary by depressed individuals because,
objectively, it was more accurate and thus more self-confirming.
Alternatively, because depressed individuals possess relatively
high levels of negative affectivity, they probably tend to focus on
their negative attributes and self-views (see Watson & Clark,
1984), especially when making self-relevant judgments. When
assessing how well the summaries confirmed their self-views,
depressed individuals may have compared feedback primarily
against their negative self-views to determine "fit," whereas low
self-esteem persons probably used both their negative and posi-
tive self-views to assess fit. Thus, negative feedback appeared to
depressed individuals to be a closer match despite the fact that
both groups possessed similarly negative global self-views, as
assessed by the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Inventory.
Curiously, although depressed participants viewed the unfa-
vorable evaluation as more self-confirming and more negative
than the favorable evaluation, they rated the unfavorable evalu-
ation more favorably than the nondepressed groups did. These
ratings may reflect the operation of depressed participants' po-
sitivity strivings: After selecting the unfavorable evaluation,
they may have been attempting to cushion the affective blow of
receiving unfavorable feedback (Swann, Griffin, Predmore, &
Gaines, 1987) by altering their perceptions of the evaluation
(i.e., by perceiving it in a more favorable light). Alternatively,
the unfavorable evaluation may have evoked more negative rat-
ings from the nondepressed groups simply because nonde-
pressed persons rarely encounter explicitly negative feedback
from others. Research by Ditto and Jemmott (1989) suggests
that stimuli encountered infrequently tend to evoke more ex-
treme judgments than commonplace stimuli. As numerous
studies have demonstrated, nondepressed persons are less likely
to elicit negative evaluations compared to depressed individuals
(e.g., Coyne, 1976a; Gotlib & Beatty, 1985; Joiner etal., 1992;
Strack & Coyne, 1983; Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, & Pelham,
1992, Study 3). Consistent with our results, nondepressed per-
sons should therefore rate unfavorable evaluations more
harshly than depressed persons. (See Pyszczynski et al., 1987,
Study 1, for a similar pattern of findings; see also Watson &
Clark, 1984, for research showing that individuals interpret
negative information differently depending on their own degree
of negativity.)
Previous research on self-verification and depression has
been critiqued on the grounds that the apathy and passivity that
often characterize depression would negate depressed individu-366 GIESLER, JOSEPHS, AND SWANN
als' interest in receiving feedback of any type (Alloy & Lipman,
1992). To the contrary, our results indicate that clinically de-
pressed individuals are very much interested in receiving evalu-
ative information. In fact, they wanted feedback just as much
as high self-esteem individuals and more than low self-esteem
individuals. Although inconsistent with the intuitive notion of
depressive apathy, this finding is consistent with research dem-
onstrating that depressed individuals often seek information to
offset perceived deficits in the ability to predict and control their
environment. For example, when compared to nondepressed
individuals, depressed individuals are more willing to pay for
feedback about the self (Gasparikova-Krasnec & Post, 1984);
seek more information and emotional support when con-
fronted with stressful events (Coyne, Aldwin, & Lazarus,
1981); and engage in more effortful information processing in
interpersonal situations, presumably out of an enhanced desire
to understand social behavior (Edwards & Weary, 1993;
Gleicher & Weary, 1991). Although the above studies relied on
self-report inventories to assess depression, their findings con-
verge with ours and suggest that depressed individuals retain a
strong interest in obtaining evaluative feedback, especially feed-
back that confirms their self-views (see also Coates & Wortman,
1980; Shustack & West, 1985).
How, then, do depressed individuals enact the desire for con-
firming feedback outside of the psychological laboratory?
Swann (1990) has described a variety of strategies that individ-
uals with negative self-views use to elicit verifying reactions
from others, especially when they feel they are being miscon-
strued. For example, Swann and Read (198 Ib, Study 2) found
that if people with negative self-views thought that their interac-
tion partner viewed them favorably, they intensified their efforts
to appear unworthy of their interaction partner's positive re-
gard. In a similar manner, when depressed persons feel they are
being misconstrued, they may behave in a hostile manner
(Coyne, 1976a; Gotlib & Robinson, 1982), engage in inappro-
priate self-disclosure (Gibbons, 1987), or enact other behaviors
commonly observed in depression to correct the mispercep-
tions of their interaction partners. As several researchers have
noted, explicitly conveying positive evaluations to depressed in-
dividuals often has the opposite effect of the one intended, re-
sulting in the expression of increased symptomatology
(Grinker, 1964; D. A. Schwartz, 1964; Watzlawick, Weakland,
& Fisch, 1974). Because friends and relations often attempt to
cheer up newly depressed individuals by denying or discon-
firming their negative self-views (Coates & Wortman, 1980),
such boomerang effects should be especially likely to occur early
in depression.
As depression deepens, individuals may abandon more active
modes of self-verification in favor of naturally occurring corre-
lates of depression such as negative facial expressions (G.E.
Schwartz et al., 1976) or monotonic speech (Teasdale et al.,
1980) to inform others of how they wish to be viewed. Alterna-
tively, they may simply withdraw from those whose appraisals
they perceive to be overly positive (e.g., Swann, Hixon, & De La
Ronde, 1992; Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, & Pelham, 1992, Study
1). Such behaviors would thus offer a naturally occurring in-
stance of the failure to seek positive appraisals displayed by the
depressed individuals in the research reported in this article.
Given that self-verification strivings lock individuals into pat-
terns of feedback seeking that sustain depression, how do indi-
viduals ever climb out of a depressed state? Most cases of de-
pression remit spontaneously (Beck, 1967), a process about
which little is known (Needles & Abramson, 1990). Our find-
ing that positivity strivings, albeit attenuated, persist in clinical
depression suggests that they may play a role in remission. Thus,
factors that have been linked to recovery (e.g., social support,
cognitive therapy, etc.) may be successful in part because of their
ability to encourage people to allow positivity strivings freer
reign to guide feedback seeking. For example, one of the goals
of cognitive therapy is to undermine the certainty with which
depressed individuals cling to their unfavorable self-views
(Beck et al., 1979). Past research has shown that individuals
tend to verify those self-views of which they are certain but so-
licit positive feedback on those self-views that are not firmly
held (Maracek & Mettee, 1972; Swann & Ely, 1984; Swann et
al., 1988). By decreasing the certainty by which depressed indi-
viduals hold their negative self-views, cognitive therapy may dis-
rupt self-verification processes, allowing positivity strivings
greater opportunity to influence self-views.
Before concluding, some caveats are in order. Because we did
not include a nondepressed, clinical control group, it could be
that one of depression's naturally occurring correlates (e.g.,
anxiety) contributed to the tendency of depressed individuals
to seek unfavorable feedback. However, this idea cannot explain
why the nondepressed, low self-esteem participants who viewed
the negative summary as more confirming than the positive
summary also tended to choose the unfavorable evaluation. Be-
cause these individuals were unlikely to have been anxious rela-
tive to depressed individuals, anxiety cannot readily account for
the similar patterns of feedback seeking exhibited by the two
groups.
Although we did not conclusively demonstrate what drove
our participants to seek confirming feedback, the positive asso-
ciation between how self-confirming participants perceived the
feedback to be and how much they wanted it is highly consistent
with past work addressing the motivational underpinnings of
self-verification theory (e.g., Swann, Hixon, & De La Ronde,
1992; Swann, Stein-Seroussi, & Giesler, 1992). Most impor-
tant, it provides support for our contention that a desire to bol-
ster perceptions of prediction and control underlies the effects
we reported. However, to the extent that prediction and control
strivings lay at the heart of depressed individuals' desire for con-
firming feedback, we believe that it is inappropriate to blame
depressed individuals for engaging in feedback-seeking activi-
ties (e.g., soliciting negative evaluations) that may exacerbate
their depressive state (see also Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, & Pel-
ham, 1992). Ordinarily, efforts to maintain or restore feelings
of prediction and control are highly adaptive. Among depressed
individuals, however, seeking confirming feedback may produce
the added and unwanted effect of sustaining a depressive epi-
sode by entrenching negative self-views (Shustack & West,
1985). Ironically, in an attempt to maximize their perceptions
of prediction and control, over the long run depressed individu-
als may be forfeiting actual prediction and control by acting in
ways that maintain their depression.
Summary and Conclusions
As predicted by self-verification theory, clinically depressed
individuals chose unfavorable evaluations over favorable butSELF-VERIFICATION AND DEPRESSION 367
nonverifying feedback. Furthermore, they failed to seek favor-
able self-verifying evaluations as aggressively as nondepressed
persons. In conjunction with past studies using depressed par-
ticipants recruited on the basis of self-report inventories (e.g.,
Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, & Pelham, 1992; Swann, Wenzlaff, &
Tafarodi, 1992), the results of the current investigation suggest
that by enacting self-verification strivings, depressed individuals
may enmesh themselves in a self-perpetuating cycle that main-
tains or exacerbates their depressed state.
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